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Abstract. The rapid growth of wireless and mobile Internet has led to
wide applications of exchanging resources over network, in which how
to fairly allocate resources has become a critical challenge. To motivate
sharing, a BD Mechanism is proposed for resource allocation, which is
based on a combinatorial structure called bottleneck decomposition. The
mechanism has been shown with properties of fairness, economic effi-
ciency [17], and truthfulness against two kinds of strategic behaviors [2,3].
Unfortunately, the crux on how to compute a bottleneck decomposition
of any graph is remain untouched. In this paper, we focus on the compu-
tation of bottleneck decomposition to fill the blanks and prove that the
bottleneck decomposition of a network G = (V,E;wv) can be computed
in O(n6 log(nU)), where n = |V | and U = maxv∈V wv. Based on the
bottleneck decomposition, a fair allocation in resource exchange system
can be obtained in polynomial time. In addition, our work completes the
computation of a market equilibrium and its relationship to two concepts
of fairness in resource exchange.
Keywords: Polynomial Algorithm · Fair Allocation · Resource Exchange
· Bottleneck Decomposition
1 Introduction
The Internet era has witnessed plenty of implementations of resource exchange
[10,11,12,13,14]. It embodies the essence of the sharing economy and captures
the ideas of collaborative consumption of resource (such as the bandwidth) to
networks with participants (or agents) [7], such that agents can benefit from
exchanging each own idle resource with others. In this paper, we study the
resource exchange problem over networks, which goes beyond the peer-to-peer
(P2P) bandwidth sharing idea [17]. Peers in such networks act as both suppliers
and customers of resources, and make their resources directly available to other
network peers according to preset network rules [16].
? Supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (No. 11301475,
61632017, 61761146005). A preliminary version is accepted by FAW 2019 [18]. Several
omitted proofs are presented in the Appendix.
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2 Yan and Zhu
The resource exchange problem can be formally modeled on an undirected
connected graph G = (V,E;w), where each vertex u ∈ V represents an agent
with wu units of divisible idle resources (or weight) to be distributed among
its neighbor set Γ (u). The utility Uu is determined by the total amount of the
resources obtained from its neighbors. Define xuv to be the fraction of resource
that agent u allocates to v and call the collection X = (xuv) an allocation. Then
the utility of agent u under allocation X is Uu =
∑
v∈Γ (u) xvuwv, subject to the
constraint of
∑
v∈Γ (u) xuv ≤ 1.
One critical issues for the resource exchange problem is how to design a
resource exchange protocol to maintain agents’ participation in a fair fashion.
Ideally, the resource each agent obtains can compensate its contribution, but
such a state may not exists due to the structure of the underlying networks.
Thus Georgiadis et al. [9] thought that an allocation is fair if it can balance the
exchange among all agents as much as possible. An exchange ratio of each agent
is defined then, to quantify the utility it receives per unit of resource it delivers
out, i.e. βu(X) =
Uu∑
v∈Γ (u) xuvwu
for given allocation X. In [9], an allocation X is
said to be fair, if its exchange ratio vector β(X) = (βu(X))u∈V is lexicographic
optimal (lex-optimal for short). And a polynomial-time algorithm is designed to
find such a fair allocation by transforming it to a linear programming problem.
On the other hand, Wu and Zhang [17] pioneered the concept of “proportional
response” inspired by the idea of “tit-for-tat” for the consideration of fairness.
Under a proportional response allocation, each agent responses to the neighbors
who offer resource to it by allocating its resource in proportion to how much
it receives. Formally, the proportional response allocation is specified by xuv =
xvuwv∑
k∈Γ (u) xkuwk
. The authors showed the equivalence between such a fair allocation
and the market equilibrium of a pure exchange economy in which each agent sells
its own resource and uses the money earned through trading to buy its neighbors’
resource.
The algorithm to get a fair allocation in [17] includes two parts: computing a
combinatorial decomposition, called bottleneck decomposition, of a given graph;
and constructing a market equilibrium from the bottleneck decomposition. The
work in [17] only involved the latter. But how to compute the bottleneck decom-
position is remained untouched. In this paper, we design a polynomial time algo-
rithm to address the computation of the bottleneck decomposition. In addition,
we show the equilibrium allocation (i.e. the allocation of the market equilibrium)
from the bottleneck decomposition also is lex-optimal. Such a result establishes
the connection between the two concepts of fairness in [9] and [17].
Another contribution of this work is to complete the computation of the mar-
ket equilibrium in a special setting of a linear exchange market. The study of
market equilibrium has a long and distinguished history in economics, starting
with Arrow and Deberu’s solution [1] which proves the existence of the market
equilibrium under mild conditions. Much work has focused on the computational
aspects of the market equilibrium. Specially for the linear exchange model, Eaves
[5] first presented an exact algorithm by reducing to a linear complementary
problem. Then Garg et al. [8] derived the first polynomial time algorithm through
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a combinatorial interpretation and based on the characterization of equilibria as
the solution set of a convex program. Later Ye [19] showed that a market equi-
librium can be computed in O(n8 log2 U)-time with the interior point method.
Recently, Duan et al. [4] improved the running time to O(n7 log2(nU)) by a
combinatorial algorithm. Compared with the general linear exchange model, we
further assume that the resource of any agent is treated with equal preference
by all his neighbors. Based on it, Wu and Zhang [17] proposed the bottleneck
decomposition, which decomposes participants in the market into several com-
ponents, and showed that in a market equilibrium, trading only happens within
each component. Therefore, the problem of computing a market equilibrium is
reduced to one of computing the bottleneck decomposition. Our main task in
this paper is to design a polynomial time algorithm to compute the bottleneck
decomposition and to complete the computation of a market equilibrium in [17].
The time complexity of our algorithm is O(n6 log(nU)), which is better than the
algorithm of Duan et al. [4], because of further assumption in our setting.
In the rest of this paper, we introduce the concepts and properties of bot-
tleneck decomposition in Section 2 and provide a polynomial time algorithm for
computing the bottleneck decomposition in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe
a market equilibrium from the bottleneck decomposition and show the fairness
of the equilibrium allocation. At last we conclude this paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminary
We consider a resource exchange problem modeled on an undirected and con-
nected graph G = (V,E;w) with vertex set V and edge set E, respectively, and
w : V → R+ is the weight function on vertex set. Let Γ (i) = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} be
the set of vertices adjacent to i in G, i.e. the neighborhood of vertex i. For each
vertex subset S ⊆ V , define w(S) = ∑i∈S wi and Γ (S) = ∪i∈SΓ (i). Note that
it is possible S ∩ Γ (S) 6= ∅ and if S ∩ Γ (S) = ∅, then S must be independent.
For each S, define α(S) = w(Γ (S))w(S) , referred to as the inclusive expansion ratio of
S, or the α-ratio of S for short. It is not hard to observe that the neighborhood
Γ (V ) is still V and its α-ratio is α(V ) = 1.
Definition 1 (Bottleneck and Maximal Bottleneck). A vertex subset B ⊆
V is called a bottleneck of G if α(B) = minS⊆V α(S). If bottleneck B is a
maximal bottleneck, then for any subset B˜ with B ⊂ B˜ ⊆ V , it must be α(B˜) >
α(B). We name (B,Γ (B)) as the maximal bottleneck pair of G.
From Definition 1, we can understand the maximal bottleneck as the bot-
tleneck whose size is maximal. Wu and Zhang [17] showed that the maximal
bottleneck of any graph is unique and proposed the following bottleneck decom-
position with the help of the uniqueness.
Definition 2 (Bottleneck Decomposition). Given an undirected and con-
nected graph G = (V,E;w). Start with V1 = V , G1 = G and i = 1. Find the
maximal bottleneck Bi of Gi and let Gi+1 be the induced subgraph on the vertex
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set Vi+1 = Vi − (Bi ∪ Ci), where Ci = Γ (Bi) ∩ Vi, the neighbor set of Bi in
the subgraph Gi. Repeat if Gi+1 6= ∅ and set k = i if Gi+1 = ∅. Then we call
B = {(B1, C1), · · · , (Bk, Ck)} the bottleneck decomposition of G, αi = w(Ci)w(Bi) the
i-th α-ratio and (αi)
k
i=1 the α-ratio vector.
We propose an example in the following to show the bottleneck decomposition
of a graph. Consider the graph of Fig. 1 which has 6 vertices. The numbers in each
circle represents the weight of each vertex. At the first step, G1 = G, V1 = V
and the maximal bottleneck pair of G1 is (B1, C1) = ({v1, v2}, {v3, v4}) with
α1 =
1
2 . After removing B1 ∪ C1, V2 = {v5, v6}, G2 = G[V2] and the maximal
bottleneck pair of G2 is (B2, C2) = ({v5, v6}, {v5, v6}) with α2 = 1. Therefore
the bottleneck decomposition is B = {({v1, v2}, {v3, v4}), ({v5, v6}, {v5, v6})}.
Fig. 1. The figure illustrates bottleneck decomposition of a network.
The bottleneck decomposition has some combinatorial properties which are
very crucial to the study on the truthfulness of BD Mechanism in [2] and [3] and
to the discussion of the fairness of resource allocation. Although Wu and Zhang
mentioned these properties in [17], their proofs are not included. We explain
these properties here and present the proofs in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Given an undirected and connected graph G = (V,E;w), the
bottleneck decomposition B of G satisfies
(1) 0 < α1 < α2 < · · · < αk ≤ 1;
(2) if αi = 1, then i = k and Bk = Ck; otherwise Bi is independent and
Bi ∩ Ci = ∅.
3 Computation of Bottleneck Decomposition
In this section, we propose a polynomial time algorithm to compute the bottle-
neck decomposition of any given network. Without loss of generality, we assume
that all weights of vertices are positive integers and are bounded by U > 0. From
Definition 2, it is not hard to see the key to the bottleneck decomposition is the
computation of the maximal bottleneck of each subgraph. But how to find the
maximal bottleneck among all of 2|V | subsets efficiently is a big challenge. To
figure it out, our algorithm comprises two phases on each subgraph. In the first
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phase, we shall compute the minimal α-ratio α∗ of the current subgraph and
find the maximal bottleneck with the minimal α-ratio in the second phase. In
the subsequent two subsections, we shall introduce the algorithms in each phase
detailedly and analyze them respectively.
3.1 Evaluating the Minimal α-ratio α∗
In this phase to evaluate the minimal α-ratio, the main idea of our algorithm is
to find the α-ratio by binary search approach iteratively. To reach the minimal
ratio, we construct a corresponding network with a parameter α and adjust α by
applying the maximum flow algorithm until a certain condition is satisfied. Be-
fore proceeding the algorithm to compute the minimal α-ratio, some definitions
and lemmas are necessary.
Given a graph G = (V,E;w) and a parameter α, a network N(G,α) (as
shown in Fig. 2-(b)) based on G and α is constructed as:
• VN = {s, t} ∪ V ∪ V˜ , where s is the source, t is the sink and V˜ is the copy of
V ;
• the directed edge set EN comprises:
- a directed edge (s, v) ∈ EN from source s to v with capacity of αwv, ∀v ∈ V ;
- a directed edge (v˜, t) ∈ EN from v˜ to sink t with capacity of wv, ∀v˜ ∈ V˜ ;
- two directed edges (u, v˜) ∈ EN and (v, u˜) ∈ EN with capacity of∞, ∀(u, v) ∈ E.
Fig. 2. The illustration of network N(G,α).
In N(G,α), let B˜ = {v˜|v ∈ B} and Γ (B˜) = {u˜|u ∈ Γ (B)}, where the latter
is called the neighborhood of B˜.
Lemma 1. For any s-t cut (S, T ) in network N(G,α), the capacity of cut (S, T )
is finite if and only if S has the form as {s}∪B∪Γ (B˜) (as shown in Fig. 2-(b))
for any subset B ⊆ V and its capacity is α(w(V )− w(B)) + w(Γ (B)).
Proof. First, if S = {s} ∪ B ∪ Γ (B˜), then there are two kinds of directed edges
in cut (S, T ):
• edge (s, u) for any u 6∈ B and the total capacity of these edges is α(w(V ) −
w(B));
6 Yan and Zhu
• edge (u˜, t) for any u˜ ∈ Γ (B˜) and the total capacity of these edges is w(Γ (B)).
So the capacity of cut (S, T ) with S = {s}∪B∪Γ (B˜) is finite and its capacity is
α(w(V )−w(B)) +w(Γ (B)). Conversely, if S 6= {s} ∪B ∪Γ (B˜), then cut (S, T )
must contain at least one edge with infinite capacity in the form as (v, u˜). At
this time the capacity of cut (S, T ) is infinite. It completes this claim. 
Lemma 1 tells that if a cut (S, T ) in N(G,α) has a finite capacity, set S must
has the form as S = {s} ∪B ∪ Γ (B˜). It is not hard to see that such a finite cut
corresponds to a subset B ⊆ V . Thus we name B as the corresponding set of
cut (S, T ). Let cap(S, T ) be the capacity of cut (S, T ) and cap(G,α) denote the
minimum capacity of network N(G,α), that is cap(G,α) = min(S,T ) cap(S, T ).
To compute the minimal α-ratio, we are more interested in the relationship
between the current parameter α and the minimal ratio α∗.
Lemma 2. Given a graph G and a parameter α. Let α∗ be the minimal α-ratio
in G and cap(G,α) be the minimum cut capacity of network N(G,α). Then
(1) cap(G,α) < αw(V ), if and only if α > α∗;
(2) cap(G,α) = αw(V ), if and only if α = α∗;
(3) cap(G,α) > αw(V ), if and only if α < α∗.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. From Lemma 2-(2), the parameter
α is equal to α∗, if and only if the corresponding set B of the minimum cut
(S, T ) in N(G,α) has its α-ratio equal to α, that is w(Γ (B))w(B) = α = α
∗. Thus we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For the network N(G,α), if the minimum cut (S, T )’s correspond-
ing set B has its α-ratio equal to α, i.e., w(Γ (B))w(B) = α, then α = α
∗.
Based on Lemma 1 and 2 and Corollary 1, following Algorithm A is derived
to compute the minimal α-ratio for any given graph G = (V,E;w).
The main idea of Algorithm A is to find α∗ by binary search approach. The
initial range of α∗ is set as [0, 1], since 0 < α∗ ≤ 1 by Proposition 1-(1). And in
each iteration, we split the range in half by comparing the minimum capacity
cap(G,α) and the value of αw(V ). Because all weights of vertices are positive
integers, each subset’s α-ratio is a rational number and the difference of any two
different α-ratios should be greater than 1w2(V ) . So once
∣∣∣w(Γ (B))w(B) − α∣∣∣ < 1w2(V ) ,
we can conclude w(Γ (B))w(B) = α and Corollary 1 makes us get
w(Γ (B))
w(B) = α = α
∗.
Thus we set the terminal condition of of Algorithm A as
∣∣∣w(Γ (B))w(B) − α∣∣∣ < 1w2(V ) .
There is only one loop in Algorithm A. After each round, the length of the
search range [a, b] is cut in half. Thus the loop ends within O(log(M)) rounds,
that is O(log(w(V ))). In each round, the critical calculation is on line 4 to com-
pute the minimum s-t cut of a given network. Applying the famous max-flow
min-cut theorem[15], it is equivalent to compute the corresponding maximum
flow. There are several polynomial-time algorithms to find maximum flow, for
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Table 1. Algorithm A: Compute the minimal α-ratio of G
Input: Graph G = (V,E;w)
Output: The minimal α-ratio α∗ of G.
1: Set a := 0, b := 1 and M := w2(V );
2: Set α := 1
2
(a+ b);
3: Constrcut network N(G,α);
4: Compute minimum s-t cut (S, T ) with its capacity cap(G,α) by Edmonds-Karp
algorithm and obtain the corresponding subset B ⊆ V ;
5: If |w(Γ (B))
w(B)
− α| < 1
M
Output α∗ = w(Γ (B))
w(B)
;
6: Else
7: If cap(G,α) > αw(V )
Set a := α, b := b and turn to line 2;
8: If cap(G,α) < αw(V )
Set a := a, b := α and turn to line 2.
instance Edmonds-Karp algorithm[6] with time complexity O(|V ||E|2). In Algo-
rithm A, we call the Edmonds-Karp algorithm to compute the minimum capacity
and have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The minimal α-ratio α∗ of G can be computed in O(|V ||E|2log(w(V )))
time.
3.2 Finding the Maximal Bottleneck
In the previous phase, we compute the minimal α-ratio α∗ by Algorithm A and
the corresponding bottleneck B′ also can be obtained. But it is possible that the
bottleneck B′ may not be maximal. So in this phase, we continue to find the
maximal bottleneck given the minimal α-ratio of α∗.
Here we introduce another network, denoted by N(G,α∗, ), for a given
parameter  > 0. To obtain network N(G,α∗, ), we first construct network
N(G,α∗), defined in Section 3.1, and then increase the capacity of edge (s, v),
for any v ∈ V , from α∗wv to α∗wv + . By similar proof for Lemma 1, we know
a cut (S, T ) in N(G,α∗, ) has a finite capacity, if and only if S has the form as
S = {s} ∪B ∪ Γ (B˜), where B ⊆ V . And the corresponding capacity becomes
cap(S, T ) = α∗(w(V )− w(B)) + (n− |B|) · + w(Γ (B))
= α∗w(V )− w(B)(α∗ − w(Γ (B))
w(B)
) + (n− |B|) · . (1)
From (1), the capacity cap(S, T ) actually depends on its corresponding set B
and the parameter . Thus we can view it as a function of B and . To simplify
our discussion in this section, we use cap(B, ), different from the notation in
the previous subsection, to represent the capacity function of cut (S, T ) where
S = {s} ∪B ∪ Γ (B˜).
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Lemma 3. Given a graph G, let B∗ be the maximal bottleneck of G. For any
 > 0, the maximal bottleneck B∗ satisfies cap(B∗, ) = minB:α(B)=α∗ cap(B, )
in network N(G,α∗, ).
Proof. For any bottleneck B with α(B) = α∗, we know cap(B, ε) = α∗w(V ) +
n · ε − ε|B|. Thus cap(B∗, ε) = minα(B)=α∗ cap(B, ε) since B∗ is the maximal
bottleneck of G. 
In other word, if the minimum cut Bˆ in N(G,α∗, ), with proper parameter
, is a bottleneck, then cap(Bˆ, ) = minB⊆V cap(B, ) = minB:α(B)=α∗ cap(B, ),
which means Bˆ is the maximal bottleneck of G.
Corollary 2. Given a graph G. If there is an  > 0 such that the corresponding
set Bˆ of the minimum cut in N(G,α∗, ) is a bottleneck, then Bˆ is the maximal
bottleneck of G.
Furthermore, once the  is small enough, the corresponding set of the min-
imum cut is the maximal bottleneck of G, shown in Lemma 4 whose detailed
proof is presented in the Appendix.
Lemma 4. Given a graph G. If  ≤ 1w3(V ) , then the corresponding set Bˆ of the
minimum cut in N(G,α∗, ) is the maximal bottleneck of G.
Based on Lemma 4, we propose the following Algorithm B to find the maxi-
mal bottleneck of a graph G if its minimal α-ration is given beforehand.
Table 2. Algorithm B: Find the maximal bottleneck of G
Input: Graph G and its minimal α-ratio α∗;
Output: The maximal bottleneck B∗ of G.
1: Set  := 1
w3(V )
;
2: Construct network N(G,α∗, );
3: Compute the minimum cut capacity cap(Bˆ, ) by Edmonds-Karp algorithm
and obtain the corresponding set Bˆ ⊆ V ;
4: Output B∗ = Bˆ;
Lemma 4 guarantees Algorithm B outputs the maximal bottleneck B∗ of G
correctly. The main body of Algorithm B is to compute the minimum cut capac-
ity of network N(G,α∗, ) which can be realized by Edmonds-Karp algorithm.
So the time complexity of Algorithm B is O(|V ||E|2).
Theorem 2. Algorithm B ouputs the maximal bottleneck of G in O(|V ||E|2)
time.
Applying Algorithm A and B, the maximal bottleneck of any given graph can
be computed. Thus by Definition 2, we can get the bottleneck decomposition of
G by iteratively calling Algorithm A and B on each subgraph. The main result
of this paper is:
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Theorem 3. Given a graph G = (V,E;w), the bottleneck decomposition of can
be computed in O(n6log(nU)) time, where n = |V | and U = maxv∈V wv.
Proof. To compute the bottleneck decomposition, Algorithm A and B are run
repeatedly. In each round we obtain the maximal bottleneck and its neighbor-
hood, then delete them and go to the next round. So the time complexity of each
round is O(|V ||E|2log(w(V ))). At the end of each round at least one vertex is re-
moved. Thus the bottleneck decomposition contains at most O(|V |) loops, which
means the total time complexity is O(|V |2|E|2log(w(V ))). Since |E| is at most
O(|V |2) and the weight of each vertex is bounded by U , the time complexity can
be written as O(|V |6log(|V |U)) = O(n6log(nU)), if |V | = n. 
4 Bottleneck Decomposition, Market Equilibrium and
Fair Allocation
To derive an allocation efficiently, Wu and Zhang [17] modeled the resource
exchange system as a pure exchange economy, and obtain the equilibrium allo-
cation by computing a market equilibrium. In this section, we shall present some
properties of it, and further prove the allocation of such a market equilibrium
not only has the property of proportional response, but also is lex-optimal.
Definition 3 (Market Equilibrium). Let pi be the price of agent i’s whole
resource, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The price vector p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn), with the allocation
X = (xij) is called a market equilibrium if for each agent i ∈ V the following
holds:
1.
∑
j∈Γ (i) xij = 1 (market clearance);
2.
∑
j∈Γ (i) xjipj ≤ pi (budget constraint);
3. X = (xij) maximizes
∑
j∈Γ (i) xjiwj, s.t.
∑
j∈Γ (i) xjipj ≤ pi and xij ≥ 0 for
each vertex i (individual optimality).
Construction of a Market Equilibrium from Bottleneck Decomposition
Given the bottleneck decomposition B = {(B1, C1), · · · , (Bk, Ck))}, an allo-
cation can be computed by distinguishing three cases [17]. For convenience, such
an allocation mechanism is named as BD Mechanism by Cheng et al [2,3]. Fig. 3
well illustrates it.
BD Mechanism:
– For αi < 1 (i.e., Bi ∩Ci = ∅), consider the bipartite graph Gˆi = (Bi, Ci;Ei)
where Ei = (Bi×Ci)∩E. Construct a network by adding source s, sink t and
directed edge (s, u) with capacity wu for any u ∈ Bi, directed edge (v, t) with
capacity wvαi for any v ∈ Ci and directed edge (u, v) with capacity ∞ for any
(u, v) ∈ Ei. By the max-flow min-cut theorem, there exists flow fuv ≥ 0 for
u ∈ Bi and v ∈ Ci such that
∑
v∈Γ (u)∩Ci fuv = wu and
∑
u∈Γ (v)∩Bi fuv =
wv
αi
. Let the allocation be xuv =
fuv
wu
and xvu =
αifuv
wv
which means that∑
v∈Γ (u)∩Ci xuv = 1 and
∑
u∈Γ (v)∩Bi xvu =
∑
u∈Γ (v)∩Bi
αi·fvu
wv
= 1.
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– For αk = 1 (i.e.,Bk = Ck = Vk), construct a bipartite graph Gˆ = (Bk, B
′
k;E
′
k)
such that B′k is a copy of Bk, there is an edge (u, v
′) ∈ E′k if and only if
(u, v) ∈ E[Bk]. Construct a network by the above method and by Hall’s theo-
rem, for any edge (u, v′) ∈ E′k, there exists flow fuv′ such that
∑
v′∈Γ (u)∩B′k fuv′ =
wu. Let the allocation be xuv =
fuv′
wu
.
– For any other edge, (u, v) 6∈ Bi × Ci, i = 1, 2, · · · , k, define xuv = 0.
Fig. 3. The illustration of BD Mechanism.
Wu and Zhang stated Proposition 2, saying that once the prices of resource
are set properly, such a price vector and the allocation from BD Mechanism
make up a market equilibrium, for which the proof is omitted in [17]. To make
readers understand clearly, we also propose the detailed proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 ([17]). Given B = {(B1, C1), · · · , (Bk, Ck))}. If the price to
each vertex is set as: for u ∈ Bi, let pu = αiwu; and for u ∈ Ci, let pu =
wu, then (p,X) is a market equilibrium, where X is the allocation from BD
Mechanism. Furthermore, each agent u’s utility is Uu = wu · αi, if u ∈ Bi;
otherwise Uu = wu/αi.
Motivated by P2P systems, such as BitTorrent, the concept of proportional
response for the consideration of fairness among all participating agents is put
forward to encourage the agents to join in the P2P system.
Definition 4 (Proportional Response). For each agent i, the allocation (xuv :
v ∈ Γ (u)) of his resource wu is proportional to what he receives from his neigh-
bors (wv · xvu : v ∈ Γ (u)), i.e., xuv = xvuwv∑
k∈Γ (u) xkuwk
= xvuwvUu .
Proposition 3. The allocation X from BD Mechanism satisfies the property of
proportional response.
Proof. For the allocation from BD Mechanism, if u ∈ Bi and v ∈ Ci, then Uu =
wu ·αi, Uv = wv/αi and fuv = xuv ·wu = xvu·wvαi . So xuv =
fuv
wu
= xvuwvαiwu =
xvuwv
Uu
and xvu =
αifuv
wv
= xuvwuwv/αi =
xuvwu
Uv
. 
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Clearly, the allocation X from BD Mechanism can be computed from the
maximum flow in each bottleneck pair (Bi, Ci), by Edmonds-Karp Algorithm.
So the total time complexity of BD Mechanism is O(n5). Combining Theorem 3
and Proposition 3, we have
Theorem 4. In the resource sharing system, an allocation with the property of
proportional response can be computed in O(n6 log(nU)).
Recently, Georgiadis et al. [9] discuss the fairness from the compensatory
point of view. They characterized the exchange performance of an allocation by
the concept of exchange ratio vector, in which the coordinate is the exchange
ratio βu(X) = Uu(X)/wu of each agent. In [9], an allocation is said to be fair,
if its exchange ratio vector is lex-optimal, and its properties are introduced in
the following. Here some notations shall be introduced in advance. Given an
allocation X, for a set S ⊆ V , N(S) = {v ∈ V : xuv > 0,∃u ∈ S} denotes
the set of agents who receive resource from agents in S. For the exchange ratio
vector β(X), the different values (level) of coordinates are denoted by l1 < l2 <
· · · < lM , M ≤ n. Let Li(X) = {v ∈ V : βv(X) = li} be the set in which each
agent’s exchange ratio is equal to li. Georgiadis et al. [9] proposed the following
characterization of a lex-optimal allocation.
Proposition 4 ([9]). 1. An allocation X with M ≥ 2 is lex-optimal, if and only
if
(1) Li is an independent set in G, i = 1, 2, · · · , bM2 c;
(2) LM−i+1 = N(Li), i = 1, 2, · · · , bM2 c;
(3) li · lM−i+1 = 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , bM2 c;
(4)
∑
u∈Li Uu =
∑
u∈LM−i+1 wu, i = 1, 2, · · · , bM2 c.
2. An allocation X with M = 1 is lex-optimal if and only if l1 = 1.
Based on above proposition, we can continue to conclude that the allocation
X from BD Mechanism is also lex-optimal.
Theorem 5. The allocation X from BD Mechanism is lex-optimal.
Proof. Given a bottleneck decomposition B = {(B1, C1), · · · , (Bk, Ck)}. By Propo-
sition 2, Uu = wu · αi if u ∈ Bi and Uu = wu/αi if u ∈ Ci. Thus each agent’s
exchange ratio can be written as: βu = αi if u ∈ Bi and Uu = 1/αi if u ∈ Ci.
If k = 1 and B1 = C1 = V , then all agents have the same exchange ratio
βu(X) = 1 = l1 with M = 1 and the second claim in Proposition 4 is satisfied
for this case. If k = 1 and αk < 1 or k > 1, then we know α1 < α2 < · · · < αk ≤ 1
by Proposition 1. The relationship between α-ratio and exchange ratio makes the
different values of βu be ordered as: α1 < · · · < αk ≤ 1/αk < · · · < 1/α1, where
αk = 1/αk if and only if αk = 1 and Bk = Ck. So the number of different values
M = 2k if αk < 1 and M = 2k − 1 if αk = 1. By the definitions of li and Li,
we have Li = Bi with li = αi < 1 and LM−i+1 = Ci with lM−i+1 = 1/αi > 1
and Li = Bi is independent by Proposition 1, i = 1, · · · , bM/2c. In addition,
since all resource exchange only happens between Bi and Ci by BD Mechanism,
LM−i+1 = N(Li) and
∑
u∈Li Uu =
∑
v∈LM−i+1 wv, i = 1, · · · , bM/2c. Until now
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all statements of the first claim are satisfied for this case. It means the allocation
X from BD Mechanism is lex-optimal. 
5 Conclusion
This paper discusses the issue of the computation of a fair allocation in the re-
source sharing system through a combinatorial bottleneck decomposition. We de-
sign an algorithm to solve the bottleneck decomposition for any graphG(V,E;wv)
in O(n6 log(nU)) time, where n = |V | and U = maxv∈V wv. Our work also com-
pletes the computation of a market equilibrium in the resource exchange system
for the consideration of economic efficiency in [17]. Furthermore, we show the
equilibrium allocation from the bottleneck decomposition not only is propor-
tional response, but also is lex-optimal, which establishes a connection between
two concepts of fairness in [9] and [17]. Involving two different definitions of fair-
ness for resource allocation, we hope to explore other proper concepts of fairness
and to design efficient algorithms to find such fair allocations in the future.
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6 Appendix
Lemma 2. Given a graph G and a parameter α. Let α∗ be the minimal α-ratio
in G and cap(G,α) be the minimum cut capacity of network N(G,α). Then
(1) cap(G,α) < αw(V ), if and only if α > α∗;
(2) cap(G,α) = αw(V ), if and only if α = α∗;
(3) cap(G,α) > αw(V ), if and only if α < α∗.
Proof. Let (S, T ) be the minimum cut of the network N(G,α) and B′ be a
bottleneck in G satisfying w(Γ (B
′))
w(B′) = α
∗. Therefore cut (S, T ) must have a finite
capacity and there exists a subset B such that S = {s} ∪ B ∪ Γ (B˜) by Lemma
1. It is possible that B 6= B′. So w(Γ (B))w(B) ≥ α∗. The minimum capacity of (S, T )
is cap(G,α) = α(w(V )− w(B)) + w(Γ (B)) = αw(V ) + w(B)(w(Γ (B))w(B) − α).
(1) If cap(G,α) < αw(V ), it is easy to deduce that α > w(Γ (B))w(B) ≥ α∗.
Conversely, if α > α∗, we can construct another cut (S′, T ′) where S′ = {s} ∪
B′ ∪ Γ (B˜′) corresponding to the bottleneck B′. Then cap(S′, T ′) = α(w(V ) −
w(B′)) +w(Γ (B′)) = αw(V ) + (α∗−α)w(B′) < αw(V ). Therefore, cap(G,α) ≤
cap(S′, T ′) < αw(V ).
(2) If cap(G,α) = αw(V ), then α = w(Γ (B))w(B) ≥ α∗. It is not hard to see if
α > α∗, then cap(G,α) < αw(V ) by Claim (1), contradicting to the condition
of cap(G,α) = αw(V ). So α = α∗. On the other hand, if α = α∗, then the fact
w(Γ (B))
w(B) ≥ α∗ makes cap(G,α) = αw(V ) + w(B)(w(Γ (B))w(B) − α∗) ≥ αw(V ). Now
let us construct cut (S′, T ′) where S′ = {s}∪B′∪Γ (B˜′). Obviously cap(G,α) ≤
cap(S′, T ′) = αw(V ). Combining above two aspects, we have cap(G,α) = αw(V )
(3) For the case cap(G,α) > αw(V ), to prove α < α∗, we suppose to the con-
trary that α ≥ α∗. Then Claim (1) and (2) promise that cap(G,α) ≤ αw(V ). It’s
a contradiction. Thus α < α∗. On the other hand, if α < α∗, we can easily infer
that cap(G,α) = αw(V ) +w(B)(w(Γ (B))w(B) −α) > αw(V ), where the inequality is
right since w(Γ (B))w(B) ≥ α∗ > α. 
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Lemma 4. Given a graph G. If  ≤ 1w3(V ) , then the corresponding set Bˆ of the
minimum cut in N(G,α∗, ) is the maximal bottleneck of G.
Proof. Denote B∗ to be the maximal bottleneck of G. In network N(G,α∗, ),
α∗w(V ) + (α(Bˆ)− α∗)w(Bˆ) + (n− |Bˆ|) ·  = cap(Bˆ, )
≤ cap(B∗, )
= α∗w(V ) + (n− |B∗|) · .
The inequality comes from the condition that cap(Bˆ, ) is the minimum cut
capacity in N(G,α∗, ). So 0 ≤ (α(Bˆ)− α∗)w(Bˆ) ≤
(
|Bˆ| − |B∗|
)
·  and
α(Bˆ)− α∗ ≤ |Bˆ| − |B
∗|
w(Bˆ)
·  ≤ |Bˆ| − |B
∗|
w(Bˆ)
· 1
w3(V )
<
1
w2(V )
.
As assumed in advance that the weights of all vertices are positive integers,
each set’s α-ratio is a rational number and the difference of any two different
α-ratios should be great than 1w(V )2 . Because α(Bˆ)−α∗ < 1w2(V ) , we can confirm
α(Bˆ) = α∗, which means Bˆ is a bottleneck. In addition, Corollary 2 makes it
sure that Bˆ is the maximal bottleneck of G. 
Proposition 1. Given an undirected and connected graph G = (V,E;w), the
bottleneck decomposition B of G satisfies
(1) 0 < α1 < α2 < · · · < αk ≤ 1;
(2) if αi = 1, then i = k and Bk = Ck; otherwise Bi is independent and
Bi ∩ Ci = ∅.
Proof. For the first claim, we try to show 0 < αi ≤ 1 for each i = 1, 2, · · · , k
firstly and then prove the monotonic increasing property of sequence {αi}.
To achieve the result of 0 < αi ≤ 1, we shall prove that each subgraph Gi
does not contain any isolated vertex. Thus based on the claim of no isolated
vertex, any vertex subset’s neighborhood in Gi is not empty and αi is larger
than 0. Meanwhile, we have a special vertex set Vi, whose neighborhood in Gi
is still Vi, because there is no isolated vertex in Gi. It implies Vi’s α-ratio in Gi
is 1. Therefore αi can not larger than 1 and it must be αi ≤ 1.
To show there is no isolated vertices in any Gi, i > 1, we suppose to the
contrary that Gi is the subgraph with the smallest index in B containing an
isolated vertex x. Then x must has neighbors in Bi−1 ∪Ci−1. Otherwise, x also
is isolated in Gi−1, which contradicts to our assumption of the smallest index
on Gi. We claim x does not have neighbors in Bi−1. If not, at least one neighbor
of x is in Bi−1. Symmetrically, x also is a neighbor of Bi−1 and it shall be in
Ci−1 = Γ (Bi−1) ∩ Vi−1. So the bottleneck decomposition tells us x should be
removed before the i-th decomposition. It’s a contradiction to the condition that
x ∈ Gi. Since x’s neighbors in Gi−1 are all contained in Ci−1, let us consider
another set Bi−1 ∪ {x} whose neighborhood in Vi−1 still is Ci−1. Obviously, its
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α-ratio is w(Ci−1)w(Bi−1)+wx < αi−1, contradicting the fact (Bi−1, Ci−1) is the maximal
bottleneck pair in Gi−1.
To prove the monotonic increasing property of sequence {αi}, we suppose to
the contrary that there exists an index i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}, such that αi ≥ αi+1, and
focus on two pairs (Bi, Ci) and (Bi+1, Ci+1). Recall Definition 2 of bottleneck
decomposition, Gi+1 = Gi − (Bi ∪ Ci). Thus Bi+1 ∩Bi = ∅, Ci+1 ∩ Ci = ∅ and
Bi ∪Bi+1 ⊆ Vi, Γ (Bi ∪Bi+1)∩Vi = Ci ∪Ci+1. And the pair (Bi ∪Bi+1, Γ (Bi ∪
Bi+1) ∩ Vi) in Gi has its α-ratio
w(Γ (Bi ∪Bi+1) ∩ Vi)
w(Bi ∪Bi+1) =
w(Ci ∪ Ci+1)
w(Bi ∪Bi+1) =
w(Ci) + w(Ci+1)
w(Bi) + w(Bi+1)
≤ αi, (2)
where the last inequality is from the assumption that w(Ci)w(Bi) = αi ≥ αi+1 =
w(Ci+1)
w(Bi+1)
. On the other hand, we know (Bi, Ci) is the maximal bottleneck of Gi
with α-ratio αi. The definition of maximal bottleneck makes
w(Γ (Bi∪Bi+1)∩Vi)
w(Bi∪Bi+1) >
αi since Bi ⊂ Bi ∪ Bi+1. It contradicts to (2). So there does not exist an index
i such that αi ≥ αi+1 and the first claim holds.
Next we turn to the second claim. If αi = 1, it must be Bi = Vi = Ci, because
Vi is the maximal one with α-ratio of 1. Therefore, Gi+1 = ∅ which means i = k.
For the case αi < 1, if Bi is not independent, then Bi ∩ Ci 6= ∅. Let us consider
subset B˜ = Bi − (Bi ∩ Ci). Obviously B˜ 6= ∅, otherwise Bi ⊆ Ci and αi ≥ 1.
For any vertex v ∈ B˜, its neighbors in Gi must be contained in Ci − Bi, i.e.,
Γ (B˜)∩Vi ⊆ Ci−Bi. So w(Γ (B˜)∩Vi)w(B˜) ≤
w(Ci)−w(Bi∩Ci)
w(Bi)−w(Bi∩Ci) < αi, contradicting to the
minimality of αi. 
Proposition 2. Given the bottleneck decomposition B = {(B1, C1), · · · , (Bk, Ck))}.
If the price to each vertex is set as: for u ∈ Bi, let pu = αiwu; and for u ∈ Ci,
let pu = wu, then (p,X) is a market equilibrium, where X is the allocation from
BD Mechanism. Furthermore, each agent u’s utility is Uu = wu · αi, if u ∈ Bi;
otherwise Uu = wu/αi.
Proof. From BD Mechanism, it is not hard to see all resource of each agent is
allocated out, which promises the condition of market clearance. In addition, BD
Mechanism assigns all resource of each agent to its neighbors from the same pair,
that is all available resource are exchanged along edges in Bi ×Ci, i = 1, · · · , k.
More specifically, for any u ∈ Bi, xuvwu = fuv and
∑
v∈Γ (u)∩Ci fuv = wu;
and for any v ∈ Ci, xvuwv = αifuv and
∑
u∈Γ (v)∩Bi fuv =
wv
αi
, where {fuv}
is the maximum flow in the network constructed from bipartite graph of Gˆ =
(Bi, Ci;Ei). Now let us turn to the budget constraints based on the previous
equalities. For each agent u ∈ Bi,∑
v∈Γ (u)∩Ci
xvupv =
∑
v∈Γ (u)∩Ci
xvuwv = αi
∑
v∈Γ (u)∩Ci
fuv = αiwu = pu; (3)
and for each agent v ∈ Ci,∑
u∈Γ (v)∩Bi
xuvpu = αi
∑
u∈Γ (v)∩Bi
xuvwu = αi
∑
u∈Γ (v)∩Bi
fuv = αi · wv
αi
= wv = pv.(4)
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Thus the allocation from BD mechanism satisfies the budget constraints.
For the individual optimality, we shall discuss the optimization problems for
each agent that max
∑
v∈Γ (u) xvuwv, subject to
∑
v∈Γ (u) xvupv ≤ pu. From the
budget constraint, the following inequalities can be deduced directly if the prices
are defined as pu = αiwu for u ∈ Bi and pv = wv for v ∈ Ci, that is for each
u ∈ Bi, ∑
v∈Γ (u)∩Ci
xvupv =
∑
v∈Γ (u)∩Ci
xvuwv = Uu ≤ pu = αiwu;
and for each v ∈ Ci,∑
u∈Γ (v)∩Bi
xuvpu = αi
∑
u∈Γ (v)∩Bi
xuvwu = αiUv ≤ pv = wv.
Obviously, above two inequalities indicate the upper bound of agent’s utility,
i.e. Uu ≤ αiwu if u ∈ Bi, and Uv ≤ wvαi if v ∈ Ci. In addition, the deduction
of (3) and (4) shows each agent’s utility reaches the upper bound following the
allocation from BD Mechanism. Therefore the condition of individual optimality
is satisfied. Of course we can get Uu = wu · αi, if u ∈ Bi and Uu = wu/αi, if
u ∈ Ci. 
